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INTRODUCTION
I found Professor Padfield’s article, An Introduction to Viewpoint Diversity
Shareholder Proposals, timely given the current political climate and thought
provoking on the roles and expectations of modern corporate
governance. Professor Padfield’s discussion of viewpoint proposals led
me to ask myself what type of “value” the modern shareholder expects.
In this comment, I will offer three thoughts on this question: (1)
shareholders no longer demand solely profit maximization from
corporations; (2) shareholders are justified in placing great value in the
composition of the board of directors; and (3) the future implications for
corporations attempting to balance intangible and tangible aspects of
value may be troublesome.
WHAT IS SHAREHOLDER VALUE?
Shareholder value is traditionally defined as the financial value that
shareholders enjoy in the company.1 This definition of shareholder value
supports the idea that a corporation is organized primarily for the profit
of the shareholders.2 Shareholder Primacy Theory reflects the idea that
shareholders “own” the corporation and, consequently, the goal of

Annie Batcheller is a third-year student at The University of Tennessee College of
Law. She is scheduled to graduate in May 2021.
1 Coryanne Hicks, What is Shareholder Value?, US NEWS (Nov. 23, 2020),
https://money.usnews.com/investing/investing-101/articles/what-is-shareholdervalue.
2 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). In Dodge, plaintiff
shareholders sued to reestablish shareholder dividends after Ford had announced that it
would cease dividends to divert these funds to lower the price of motor vehicles and
grow the company. Id. at 683–84. The court found that corporations exist to conduct
business on behalf of the shareholders and reinstated the dividends. Id. at 684–85.
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corporations is to maximize returns for shareholders.3 However, recent
economic and social movements, including the 2008 “Great Recession,”
have revealed changing attitudes regarding corporate governance which
challenge the long-held Shareholder Primacy Theory.4
Contemporary interpretations share a broader and more robust view
of shareholder value. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court stated,
“modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to
pursue profit at the expense of everything else . . . .”5 Additionally,
current scholars describe shareholders as “‘prosocial,’ meaning they are
willing to sacrifice at least some profits to allow the company to act in an
ethical and socially responsible fashion.”6 This type of prosocial behavior
is evidenced by shareholder votes to reduce or sacrifice profits in exchange
for desirable social or political benefits.7
Accordingly, current attitudes suggest that profit maximization is no
longer the only factor in the shareholder value formula and hint that
shareholder value has morphed into an inclusive concept encompassing
financial, social, and political elements. Many shareholders not only want
to receive some sort of economic value from their stake in the company,
but also want to receive more intangible measures of value–such as pride
in ownership. Thus, Professor Padfield’s call for more diverse ideological
representation on corporate boards is consistent with current decisions
and scholarships that suggest shareholders place value not only on the
financial decisions of the board but also the social and political decisions.

See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (Univ. of Chicago
Press 2002).
4 Faith Stevelman, Myths About Shareholder Value, 3 ACCOUNT. ECON. LAW 1, 6–7
(2013).
5 573 U.S. 682, 711–12 (2014).
6 Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE
(June 26, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/06/26/the-shareholder-valuemyth/.
7 Recently, Chevron shareholders approved a proposal to hold the company to
climate change objectives in the Paris Climate Accord, which would undoubtedly impose
added costs on Chevron’s operations. See generally Kellie Mejdrich, Chevron Shareholders
Approve Climate Change Lobbying Proposal, POLITICO (June 20, 2020), https://www.politic
o.com/news/2020/06/02/chevron-shareholders-approve-climate-change-lobbyingproposal-297520.
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SHAREHOLDER INTEREST IN THE COMPOSITION
OF A BOARD OF DIRECTORS
If shareholder value goes beyond profit maximization, then
shareholders are justified in using viewpoint diversity proposals to demand
a board of directors that protects their intangible aspects of shareholder
value. A 2019 study conducted by Michigan State University researchers
found that political leanings affect the way people make group decisions,
and this leaning is especially strong when any discussion involves
politically charged decisions.8 The study also found that groups of solely
Democrats or Republicans were likely to arrive at a decision consistent
with the ideals of their political party.9 With corporations making more
decisions that seem political, the political makeup of the board of
directors could greatly affect the outcome of board decisions and either
directly increase or decrease the shareholder value to a prosocial
shareholder depending on whether their political ideology matches the
ideology of the board.10 Thus, if modern shareholders expect companies
to provide value beyond profit maximization, the sociological studies
behind group decision making evidence that companies should take
Professor Padfield’s advice and concern themselves with the political
make-up of their boards.
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
As Professor Padfield mentions, ideologically uniform boards may
have broad future implications on corporate governance. Whether one
subscribes to the idea that a corporation increases shareholder value
through profit maximization or by promoting other intangible aspects of
“value” may be inconsequential in today’s political climate. Boards of
directors are increasingly finding themselves making tough decisions

See generally Brian Mantana et. al, Assessing the Effects of Partisan Bias at the Group Level
of Analysis: A Hidden Profile Experiment, 47 AM. POL. RSCH. 1283 (2019).).
9 Id.
10 See Matthew Scott, Investors Push For More Politics in the Boardroom, CORP. BD.
MEMBER, https://boardmember.com/investors-push-for-more-politics-in-theboardroom/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). See generally Abhinav Gupta & Adam J. Wowak,
The Elephant (or Donkey) in the Boardroom: How Political Ideology Affects CEO Pay,
ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE Q., Mar. 2017 (surveying the effects of conservative and
liberal political ideology of directors on pay of CEOs and suggesting wider ranging
implications).
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regarding social or political issues.11 Businesses who do not take certain
political stances run the risk of reduced profits, outcry from shareholders,
boycotts, or worse, as Professor Padfield points out, being “cancelled”
from constituents on both sides of the aisle.12 Navigating the current
environment between tangible and intangible aspects of shareholder value
could prove troublesome for corporate governance.
Corporations likely will not face any legal consequences due to
increased political action. Most corporate actions by boards, including
political spending, are protected under the business judgment rule.13
However, increasing polarization and growing disconnect between US
political ideologies could possibly lead investors, shareholders, and
customers shunning businesses because they question the
“reasonableness” of political decisions from all one-viewpoint boards.14
This begs the question: should the boardroom be so politicized? This
is likely not a fault of corporate governance, but one of societal influences
11 Steven M. Hass & Meghan Garrett, Political and Social Issues in the Boardroom:
Examples from the Gun Industry, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 26, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/26/political-and-social-issues-in-theboardroom-examples-from-the-gun-industry; see also Our Commitment, BUS. ROUNDTABLE
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/ (stating
that corporations are shifting their focus from shareholders to other constituents, such
as customers and employees).
12 Alison Moody, Risky Business: Do Companies Pay a Price for Expressing Political Views,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/2017/mar/14/business-politics-trump-travel-ban-yahoo-apple; Todd Lido,
Boycott Trump: Companies to Avoid Updated for 2020, DONEGOOD (June 4, 2020),
https://donegood.co/blogs/news/boycott-trump-companies-to-avoid; The Definitive
List of Liberal, Progressive and/or Anti-Trump Agenda Driven Companies that You Should Boycott,
INVESTING ADVICE WATCHDOG, https://www.investingadvicewatchdog.com/LiberalCompanies-Boycott.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
13 See Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1147–48 (2013); David Rosenberg, Goodwill and the Excess of
Corporate Political Spending, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 29, 31–32 (2015).
14 See Arthur C. Brooks, You’re Probably Making Incorrect Assumptions About Your
Opposing Political Party, WASHINGTON POST (July 26, 2019, 4:27 PM), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/opinions/youre-probably-making-incorrect-assumptions-about-youropposing-political-party/2019/07/26/9f888f0a-a995-11e9-86ddd7f0e60391e9_story.html (“Today, more than 90 percent of both Republicans and
Democrats describe people in their own party as ‘honest,’ ‘reasonable’ and ‘caring.’
Meanwhile, more than 80 percent in each party describe the other side as ‘brainwashed’
and ‘hateful.’”); see also B. C., Study Finds Intractable Conflicts Stem from Misunderstanding of
Motivation, SCIENCEDAILY (Nov. 4, 2014), www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/11/14
1104083946.htm.
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and implores us to ask ourselves how we got here and whether it is a good
thing. On one hand, we now seem to hold corporations to a higher social
responsibility standard. There has undoubtedly been good associated with
this—membership of women and minorities on boards is at an all-time
high.15 On the other, we should ask: what standard do we hold
corporations to and who gets to set it?16
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the changing landscape on corporate law, the science
behind group decision making, and the potential future implications of
the changing definition of shareholder value should caution corporations
to heed Professor Padfield’s advice and consider the ideological
composition of their boards.

Alliance for Board Diversity Report, LEAP, https://www.leap.org/alliance-for-boarddiversity-report (last visited Mar. 9, 2021).
16 See David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value is No Longer Everything,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/business/busines
s-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html; see also Steve Denning, Making Sense of Shareholder
Value: ‘The World’s Dumbest Idea’, FORBES (Jul. 17, 2017, 7:29 PM) https://www.forbes.c
om/sites/stevedenning/2017/07/17/making-sense-of-shareholder-value-the-worldsdumbest-idea/?sh=5eecaf082a7e (quoting former GE CEO Jack Welch’s declaration
that shareholder value is “the dumbest idea in the world. Shareholder value is a result,
not a strategy . . . your main constituencies are your employees, your customers and your
products.”); BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 11.
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